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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2a(3)(j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying DUC summary judgment based on
a waiver by Continental of any right to avoid the insurance policy.
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.
Civ. Proc. 56. The appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness, granting them no deference. The court also resolves whether the trial court
correctly determined if there are disputed issues of material fact, which must be resolved
against the movant. Lopez v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 932 601, 603 (Utah 1997).
Preservation of Issue: R. 290-332, 551-565, 705-714, 719-722, 770-772.

ISSUE 2: Whether the trial court erred in granting Continental summary judgment, by
finding there was no genuine dispute of material fact, and by holding that as a matter of
law Kingston made material misrepresentations on his application for insurance.
Standard of Review:

Same as for Issue 1.

Preservation of Issue: R. 1172-1270, 1274-1373, 1416-1710, 1720-1721, 1796-1836,
1858-1934, 1940-1965, 1969-1980, 2034-2043, 2552-2555.

_

1

.

ISSUE 3: Whether the trial court erred in denying DUC's motion to strike the affidavit
of Kathleen Wentzel and portions of the deposition of Brent Christensen.
Standard of Review:

Whether evidence is admissible is a question of law, which the

appellate court reviews for correctness, using a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review
for factual determinations.

An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence is

reversible error if it is reasonably likely the error affected the outcome. Cal Wadsworth
Constr. v. City of St. George. 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995).
Preservation of Issue: P. 529-541, 633-641, 662-664, 691-693, 716-718

ISSUE 4: Whether the trial court erred in its award of costs to Continental.
Standard of Review:

"The determination to award taxable costs is within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion."
Onu Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 460 (Utah 1993).
Preservation of Issue:

R. 2527-25451, 2556-2561.

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c):
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
Utah Rule of Evidence 602:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support
a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.

_
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of The Case.
This is an action by to determine whether Continental is entitled to rescind a

homeowner's insurance policy issued to Kingston based on alleged material
misrepresentations in his insurance application.
DUC sold Kingston a residence in Bountiful, Utah. In March of 1994 Kingston
applied for homeowner's insurance through Jackson Insurance Agency, whose agent
Brent Christensen prepared Kingston's application. Kingston told Christen the home was
built in the late 1800's, and was renovated during 1987-90. On Kingston's application,
Christensen wrote the home's year of remodel for the home's age. Christensen submitted
the application to CNA, who insured the house through Continental.
On July 4, 1997 a fire damaged the home and its contents. Kingston immediately
contacted Continental, who had its agents investigate the fire and Kingston's insurance
claim, and learned the home's true age and status. From July 1997 to March 1998,
Continental consistently treated Kingston's policy as in full force and effect. Continental
told Kingston his losses were covered. Continental induced Kingston to enter into a
demolition contract, and authorized and paid for demolition work on the home.
Continental completed a scope of repairs, solicited prices and obtained commitments from
contractors, and authorized restoration work at Continental's expense. Continental also
paid Kingston's temporary living expenses, and required Kingston to prepare a detailed

-

3

-

inventory of his personal property losses. Continental invoked a contract clause in the
policy requiring Kingston to submit to an examination under oath. As late as January of
1998 Continental told Kingston that Continental was continuing to move Kingston's claim
forward. In February of 1998 Continental sent Kingston an insurance renewal notice.
Continental accepted Kingston's premium payment and renewed the policy.

II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court.
In March of 1998 Continental filed this action to rescind Kingston's insurance policy,
alleging Kingston misrepresented in his application the home's age among other things.
Kingston was buying the home from D. U. Company, Inc. (DUC), whom Continental
joined as an interested party. Kingston and DUC counterclaimed for breach of the
insurance contract.
Kingston also filed a Third Party Complaint against Bent Christensen and Jackson
Insurance Company, the agent and agency who sold Kingston the insurance policy. The
claims against Christensen and Jackson were settled. All claims involving Christensen
and Jackson were dismissed by stipulation. Christensen and Jackson were dismissed as
parties and are not involved in this appeal.
DUC filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which Kingston joined, asking
the trial court to rule that Continental had waived any right to rescind Kingston's policy
by accepting Kingston's premiums and renewing the policy after knowing the facts it
relies on to rescind. Continental filed a cross motion asking the trial court to rule

-
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Continental was entitled to rescind the policy based on Kingston's application allegedly
misrepresenting the home's age, its status as a single family residence, and its prior
insurance or lack thereof. The trial court denied DUC's motion on the grounds it found
no evidence of an intent to waive. The trial court also denied Continental's cross motion
on the grounds there were questions of fact as to whether Kingston made material
misrepresentations.
After further discovery, Continental filed a new motion for summary judgment, again
asking the court to rule as a matter of law Kingston made a material misrepresentation
in his application as to the home's age. DUC, joined by Kingston, opposed the motion
on the grounds there were numerous questions of material fact, including questions of
fact as to whether Kingston made an innocent misstatement, whether any misstatements
constituted material misrepresentations, whether Continental reasonably relied on the
application, whether Continental had waived any right to rescind, or was estopped to
rescind, and whether Continental's own misrepresentations and conduct barred it from
rescinding. The trial court resolved numerous questions of fact in favor of Continental,
the moving party, dismissed DUC's and Kingston's counterclaims, and granted summary
judgment in favor of Continental, declaring as a matter of law Continental had a right to
rescind Kingston's insurance policy based on a material misrepresentation in his
application as to the home's age. This appeal follows.

_

^ _

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

1. On or about April 16, 1989 D. U. Company sold Kingston a residence located
at 1201 North 200 West, Bountiful, Utah pursuant to an unrecorded real estate sales
contract. [R 303 1 1, 1877 1 1, 1890 1 1]
2. The home was constructed in the latter 1800's. During about 1986 through about
1990 die residence was remodeled, including replacement of the roof and renovation of
the electrical, plumbing and heating systems. [R 303 1 2, 1877 1 2, 1890 1 2]
3. Jackson Insurance Agency (Jackson) was Continental's agent. Christensen was
Jackson's and Continental's agent. [R 1055 11 3, 4]
4. In February of 1994 Kingston contacted Christensen to ask about automobile
insurance. Christensen persuaded Kingston to apply for a package auto and home policy.
During their initial phone conversation, Christensen asked Kingston questions about the
property to be insured, which Kingston truthfully answered.

Among other things,

Kingston told Christensen Kingston thought the house was built about 1890. Christensen
provided Kingston with a computer printout that includes an entry confirming Christensen
knew die home was more than a century old. [R 622, 625, 630 1877 1 3, 1883]
5. On March 18, 1994 Kingston came to Christensen's office at Jackson shortly before
closing time to complete Kingston's insurance purchase. [R 303, 1878, 1890, 1894]
6. Christensen prepared an insurance application using CNA's application form.
Christensen had the form on his desk facing him and upside down to Kingston.

Christensen asked Kingston questions and filled in the entries himself.

Kingston

truthfully answered every question Christensen put to Kingston. Kingston reasonably
relied on Christensen to fill the form out correctly. [R 304, 1878, 1894]
7. Christensen has no recollection of conversing with Kingston, or filling out the
application, or of anything Kingston told him. [R 1899-1900, 1905-1907]
8. Christensen looked to CNA's underwriting guidelines to tell him what
information to ask for. [R 1903]
9. Kingston never told Christensen or anyone else at Jackson that the home was
built in 1990. Kingston described the home to Christensen as a pioneer home built in the
1800's and that the home had been extensively remodeled around 1990, including updates
to the heating, plumbing, electrical and roofing. [R 1878 % 6, 1894 1 4]
10. Christensen's practice in asking customers whether their home was a single
family residence was to ask, not how the house was constructed, but simply whether one
family lived there. [R 1902, 1909, 1912]
11. CNA's underwriting guidelines stated [R 1932]:
1. Eligibility
A. Owner Occupied
(1) A Universal Security Policy may be issued to an owner-occupant of a dwelling
which is used exclusively for private residential purposes and contains not more
than 2 families with not more than 2 boarders or roomers per family unit. . .
12. Continental has never claimed Kingston's home was anything other than an
owner-occupied dwelling, used exclusively for private residential purposes, containing
not more than 2 families. [Record generally]

-
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13. Kingston truthfully told Christensen the home was a single family residence.
When Kingston applied for insurance, only his immediate family occupied the residence.
Since that time there have never been three families occupy the home at the same time,
nor has it been used for three separate living quarters. [R 1878 1 7, 1895 1 7]
14. Kingston told Christensen he did not believe the home was currently insured.
Kingston did not tell Christensen the home had been insured by CSE, or provide
Christensen a policy number for any prior insurance on the home. [R 1878 1 8, 1894 1
4, 1895 1 5 , 1896 18]
15. Christensen told Kingston CNA would inspect the home, leading Kingston to
understand the home would be inspected, so that the insurer would independently verify
the home's age and condition. [R 1878 1 9, 1895 1 5]
16. Christensen told Kingston his office closed at 5:00 p.m., and that he had to leave
soon. He asked Kingston to sign the application. [R 1878 1 10, 1894 1 4, 1895 1 5]
17. Because of Christensen's time constraint and Jackson's closing time, Kingston
did not have time to closely examine Christensen's entries on the application form.
Kingston quickly glanced through the form, and noticed some of the spaces on the
application remained blank. The space for previous insurance was blank, and was filled
in after Kingston left the application at Jackson. Kingston was not the source of any
information about previous insurance on the home. [R 1878-1879 t i l , 1894-1895 1 5]
18. The spaces for describing the distance from a fire hydrant and the fire department
were also blank. Christensen told Kingston he would get that information himself. [R
1879 1 12, 1895 15]
-

8

-

19. The information for lien holder was blank. Christensen asked Kingston the
seller's name. Kingston said he did not recall the exact name. Christensen told Kingston
he would call for that information, but never did. [R 1879 1 13, 1887-1888, 1895 1 5]
20. Christensen had filled in the age of the home as having been built in 1990.
Kingston brought it to his attention that the home was built in the 1800's, not 1990 as
Christensen had written. Christensen replied in substance that if the home had been
remodeled in 1990, it was appropriate to prepare the form by giving the year of the
home's remodel as the home's age. [R 1879 1 14, 1894-1895 1 5]
21. Kingston asked for a copy of the application. Christensen replied that because
some lines were still blank, he would complete the application and send Kingston a copy
after he had finished filling it in. [R 1879 1 15, 1895 1 5]
22. Christensen's usual practice would have been to put at least some information on
Kingston's application that Christensen knew was inaccurate. [R 1905]
23. Alterations were made to Kingston's application after Kingston signed the
application. [R 1899-1901, 1903-1904, 1908-1911]
24. CNA then issued Kingston an insurance policy, underwritten by its subsidiary
Continental Insurance Company. About two or three weeks later, Kingston was mailed
a copy of the insurance policy. Kingston was not provided a copy of his insurance
application, and never saw the application again until at least January of 1998. [R 304
1 5 , 368, 1879 1 15, 1895 156]
25. CNA's underwriting guidelines allowed writing insurance on older homes. The
underwriting guidelines do not suggests Continental would refuse to insure older homes
_ o _

such as Kingston's. Except for the "Age of Dwelling Discount", allowing a reduction
in premiums for newer homes, the CNA underwriting guidelines did not even mention,
yet alone restrict, underwriting homes of any particular age. [R 1443-1464]
26. CNA's underwriting policies for older homes specifically authorized, and even
affirmatively encouraged, underwriting older homes that showed maintenance including
upgrading of plumbing, heating, wiring and roofing.

CNA's underwriter policy

authorized its agents to write policies on holder homes where the plumbing, heating,
wiring and roofing had been upgraded [R 1466-1478]:
While some companies have established underwriting acceptability standards based
upon year of construction (e.g., homes built prior to 1950 are ineligible for their
preferred program), Continental does not subscribe to this philosophy. We have
avoided this type of restrictive approach because an older home can be as good a
risk - and in many cases, an even better risk - than a new home.
Older homes that show evidence of preventive and proper maintenance, including
upgrading of plumbing, heating, wiring, and roofing, can be excellent risks.
27. Continental's underwriting policy is reflected in its application form. In the
space labeled "Year Built" appears an asterisk directing one to a line below stating:
* If over 29 years old, provide year updates were made: Heating

Plumbing

Wiring

Roof

The application form thus indicates and allows a jury to find that had Christensen
properly filled out Kingston's application to state the house was over 29 years old with
the heating, plumbing, wiring and roof recently updated, as it was, Continental still
would have insured the property. [R 1484]
28. Utah's industry standard is that an older home with recent upgrades to the roof,
heating, electrical, and plumbing systems is insurable. A reasonable insurer would insure

-
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a home built in the 1800f s with no obvious structural defects and recent upgrades to those
systems. [R 17099 1 4]
29. There are thousands of older homes in Utah, many of which are in Davis
County, that a reasonable insurer would insure, and that have in fact been insured by
reasonable insurers. [R 1709 f 5]
30. Presented with information that Kingston's house was built in the 1800's,
remodeled between approximately 1987 and 1990, with the roof, heating, electrical, and
plumbing recently upgraded and in generally good condition, a reasonable insurer would
have accepted the risk and issued a home owner's policy. [R 1709 t 6]
31. As Continental's own agent and expert Steve Nickel knew, Continental itself
insured older (circa 1800's) homes in Utah. [R 1513-1515, 1518-1519]
32. Structurally, the house is a single family residence, with interior masonry fire
walls. [R 1918-1930]
33. From March 18, 1994 through July 4, 1997, Kingston timely paid all premiums
on the insurance policy, which remained in full force and effect. [R 304 t 6, 1879 1 16]
34. On Friday, July 4, 1997, a fire caused substantial damage to the home and its
contents. [R 304 1 7, 370 1 9, 1880 1 18]
35. Kingston immediately contacted Continental. On July 7, 1997, Continental's
adjuster Dennis Yee retained Steve Nickel of Wasatch Claims Service, an independent
insurance broker, to contact Kingston and begin adjusting the loss. Continental hired
Fire Investigation to assist in assessing the damage. The next day, Nickel and Fire
Investigations inspected the house and the damage to the structure. Nickel brought Utah
-
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Disaster Kleenup, a restoration contractor, to inspect the damage. By letter dated July
11, 1997, Fire Investigations informed Continental, "The home is over one hundred years
old ..." Nickel also took pictures of the house and forwarded them to Yee. [R 304 1 7,
370110, 1492-1495, 1501-1503, 1510-1513, 1520-1533, 1541, 1678-1680, 1702, 1880]
36. Also on July 7, 1997, Yee advised Kingston that he had coverage for fire loss to
the dwelling and contents. [R 1692]
37. During his initial inspection, Nickel told Kingston that Nickel would prepare a
repair estimate and get an agreed price with restoration contractors, and that Kingston
could pick either contractor, or take his estimate to another contractor. Nickel also spoke
with Yee by phone, and relayed a message from Yee to Kingston that Continental had a
check in the mail to cover Kingston's immediate expenses, and would if necessary assist
Kingston in finding temporary housing. [R 1496-1498]
38. By July 14, 1997, Continental had set reserves for payment of Kingston's losses.
[R 1693]
39. On July 30, 1997, Continental's regional field supervisor Mike Wagner inspected
the house with Nickel, and saw the home's age and condition. [R 1694]
40. On July 31, Wagner and Nickel worked on an agreed price with Utah Disaster
Kleenup for the scope of repairs. Wagner discussed the matter with Yee, who agreed to
contact Kingston and Utah Disaster Kleenup to secure permission and a time line for
demolition work. [R 1694]
41. On August 4, 1987, Wagner asked Nickel to have Kingston arrange for
demolition work on the home. [R 1500, 1679]
-
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42. Also on August 4, 1987, Yee spoke with Kingston, and agreed to have Utah
Disaster Kleenup commence demolition and construction work on the house.

Yee

authorized Kingston to hire Utah Disaster Kleenup to do demolition and restoration work
on the home, and told Kingston that the insurance would pay to repair the home. Yee
then told Utah Disaster Kleenup that Kingston had approved it to start work. Wagner
also approved demolition work on the house. Utah Disaster Kleenup agreed to contact
Kingston for permission to work on the home. [R 1506, 1681-1682, 1702, 1880]
43. In reasonable reliance on Mr. Yee's representations, Kingston asked Utah
Disaster Kleenup to begin work, who beginning in August of 1997 did demolition work
to prepare for restoration. [R 1702 1 21, 1880 1 21]
44. Continental also authorized restoration work on the house, and agreed to pay for
both demolition and restorative work on the house. [R 1057, 1683]
45. Kingston forwarded Utah Disaster Kleenup's demolition bill to Continental, who
paid Utah Disaster Kleenup for its demolition work. [R 1702 1 22, 1880 1 22]
46. Mr. Yee authorized Kingston to move his family into temporary lodging, and told
Kingston the insurance wtiuld pay. Continental paid for Kingston's initial moving and
temporary living expenses.

Mr. Yee also asked Kingston to inventory Kingston's

personal property losses, for which he also told Kingston the insurance would pay. Mr.
Yee thereby induced Kingston to believe Kingston's insurance would pay Kingston's
claim, including for damage to the home. [R 1702 120, 1703 125, 1880 120, 1881 125]
47. Near completion of demolition, Craig Call, a descendant of the Call family who
originally built the home, called Kingston. Call told Kingston the house had historic
-
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value and the demolition work could damage the historic value. He told Kingston he
wanted to make an offer on the house, and asked if Kingston would hold off on further
demolition. Kingston spoke with Utah Disaster Kleenup, who told Kingston there was
only about one more day of demolition work left. Kingston then asked Utah Disaster
Kleenup to stop work pending discussions with Mr. Call. [R 1702 121-23, 1880121-23]
48. Nickel called Kingston and told him every day the house wasn't done was costing
the insurance company money, and Continental would insist the house either be repaired
or that Kingston sign a release, and he would have to make a decision promptly as to
whether to sell the home or to proceed with reconstruction. [R 1516-1517]
49. After considering Mr. Call's proposal, Kingston decided not to sell. When
Kingston talked to Utah Disaster Kleenup about the restoration work, it informed
Kingston it had not yet been paid for the demolition work. It was reluctant to return to
the job until it was paid or at least had firm assurance of payment. Because Kingston was
financially unable to pay himself, the reconstruction work could not resume until
Continental either paid Utah Disaster Kleenup for the work already done or reassured
Utah Disaster Kleenup that payment would be forthcoming. [R 1703 1 24, 1881 1 24]
50. In August 1997 Wagner again inspected the house with Nickel. [R 1513]
51. By letter dated September 2, 1987, Nickel informed Wagner he had completed
his repair estimate and that two contractors had agreed to his price, and submitted the
demolition invoice to Continental for payment. [R 1504-05, 1534-38, 1679]
52. Wagner pushed to get restoration work moving. By a September 15, 1997 letter,
Nickel gave Wagner his final scope of repairs, with contractor confirmations of Nickel's
-
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scope of repairs as an agreed-on price. Nickel referred Utah Disaster Kleenup's payment
request to Yee. There was no discussion about Continental denying the claim. All of
Nickel's work to that time was done with a point in view that Continental considered the
policy valid and would pay for Kingston's losses. [R 1507-1509, 1680]
53. On September 19, 1997, Nickel told Kingston an agreement had been reached
by Continental and the restoration contractors for the repair of the structure. [R 1682]
54. Continental also agreed to pay additional living expenses of Kingston and his
family, and asked Kingston to inventory his personal property and submit a proof of loss,
and paid Kingston for additional living expenses. [R 1057]
55. On January 19, 1998, while taking Kingston's sworn statement pursuant to a
policy provision, after Continental had inspected the home and knew its age and
condition, Continental told Kingston it was moving Kingston's claim forward, and was
mainly awaiting documentation on Kingston's personal property losses. [R 1697]
56. Continental did not return any insurance premiums to Kingston. Instead, on
every policy anniversary until the trial court's final judgment, Continental repeatedly
renewed Kingston's insurance policy, billed Kingston for insurance premiums, accepted
Kingston's premium payments, and continued the insurance policy in full force and
effect. [R 304 1 8, 10, 309-326, 706, 708-714, 1058, 1683-84, 1701 1 16, 1703 11 2627, 1879 1 16, 1880 1 17, 1881 1 26-27]
57. On April 2, 1998 Kingston spoke by phone with an agent at Jackson, who told
Kingston the policy had been renewed on March 18, 1998. Kingston made clear to the
agent that the house was built in the 1860's; that the roof, electrical and plumbing had
-
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been replaced in 1987 and the heating in 1990. The agent assured Kingston those facts
were not substantial and would not affect the policy. [R 305-308]
58. After Kingston's failure to repair the damage to the house as a result of plaintiff s
failure to pay Kingston's claim, DUC gave Kingston notice of default on the UREC,
declared the unpaid balance due and payable, and began foreclosure.

In partial

settlement, Kingston assigned to D. U. Company his claims against Christensen, Jackson,
and Continental. [R 1799-1800, 1820-28]
59. On February 26, 2003, Continental served a Memorandum and Affidavit of Costs
and Disbursements, in the amount of $5,257.85, representing the full amount of
deposition and witness fees expended by Continental, regardless of the need or use for
the depositions.

[R 2546-2551]

60. On March 3, 2004 Kingston timely objected to Continental's costs, and served
a Motion to Tax Bill of Costs, on the grounds many of the depositions were not essential
to the preparation of the case.

[R 2527-2530]

61. On March 18, 3002 Continental served its Memorandum in Opposition to Tax
Bill of Costs.

[R 2531-2542]

62. On March 25, 2003, Kingston timely served his Reply to Memorandum in
Opposition to Tax Bill of Costs.

[R 2556-2561]

63. On March 21, 2003, before Kingston's Reply Memorandum was due, and
without a Request to Submit for Decision, the trial court denied Kingston's motion and
awarded the full amount of costs requested by Continental. The trial court entered its
Order to the same effect on March 24, 2004. [R 2543-2545, 2552-2555]
-

16 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Utah has adopted the black letter common law rule that an insurer with knowledge
of a right to rescind an insurance policy who does any substantial act which recognizes
the contract as in force, such as accepting a premium payment, waives his right to
rescind. It is undisputed that Continental, after knowing all facts upon it relies on to
rescind Kingston's policy, thereafter sent Kingston a renewal notice, accepted his
premium payment, and renewed his policy. As a matter of law, Continental's substantial
act recognizing Kingston's policy as in force was a waiver of any right to rescind. The
trial court committed reversible error when it refused to recognize Continental's acts as
a waiver of its right to rescind.
A trial court may not grant summary judgment if there is a genuine dispute of
material fact. The trial court granted summary judgment to Continental, ruling Kingston
as a matter of law made a material misrepresentation in his insurance application about
the age of his home. The trial court committed reversible error by either ignoring or
resolving issues of material fact, including whether the age of the home was an innocent
misstatement; whether under the home's age was material; whether Continental
reasonably relied on the application; whether numerous and sundry acts by Continental
recognizing the policy in effect acted as a waiver of any right to rescind; whether
Kingston's reliance on Continental's acts operates as an estoppel of Continental's right
to rescind; and whether Continental's own misrepresentations and other culpable acts
through its agents act as a bar to rescission.
-
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Utah Rule of Evidence 602 states a witness may not testify to a matter unless the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter. To support its positions on summary
judgment, Continental offered statements by Kathleen Wentzel and Brent Christensen that
were not based on their personal knowledge. Those statements were material to the
motions and had a substantive effect on the outcome of the motions. The trial court
committed reversible error by admitting those statements over DUC's objections.
Continental deposed several people whose depositions Continental never used for any
purpose. Continental also deposed experts when it could have discovered their testimony
by less expensive means. The trial court erred by awarding Continental all of its costs
in taking depositions, even before the time allowed Kingston and DUC to respond to
Continental's application for award of costs had run, and without making any finding as
to the need for the depositions.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURTkRRED IN DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
APPELLANTS, WHEN CONTINENTAL WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO
AVOID KINGSTON'S POLICY AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. It has three elements: (1)

an existing right; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the
right. The intention to relinquish a right may be express or implied, and may be implied
from action or inaction. K & T, Inc. v. Korouliz, 888 P.2d 623, 628-29 (Utah 1994).

-
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An insurer waives a right to rescind a policy if the insurer has knowledge of facts
giving a right to rescind and then does any substantial act that treats the policy as in
force. The insurer's intent to waive is implied as a matter of law from the insurer's act.
Among other acts, an insurer who, after learning facts supporting a right to rescind,
accepts premium payments, waives any right to rescind.
In Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 232 P.2d 754 (Utah 1951), Alice
Farrington used a building as a skating rink, and later for dances. When a storm
collapsed the roof, she used the building for storage. Farrington then contacted Bowman
for insurance. Bowman prepared an application incorrectly describing the structure as
a "building occupied as a skating rink."

An insurer wrote a policy based on the

application. When a fire destroyed the building, the insurer denied liability. When
Farrington sued, the insurer claimed a right to rescind, arguing the structure was largely
a mass of debris, not u a building occupied as a skating rink" as stated in the application.
The Farrington Court stated that by accepting premiums after investigating the fire and
acquiring knowledge of the facts, the insurers had waived any right to rescind:
As hereinbefore stated, the fire occurred April 22, 1949. Within four days
thereafter, the adjuster for the defendant company ... was on the scene
investigating the fire thoroughly; talked to the fire department chief; took
pictures and inventoried material. All of the facts upon which the defendant
claims right of rescission were known to the defendant within a very few days
of the fire. A month and a half later, on June 9, 1949, the plaintiff paid and the
defendant company accepted $163.40 as the remaining balance on the premium.
They made no claim of a right to avoid and rescind the policy until the filing of
their amended answer and counterclaim April 25, 1950, just a year and three
days after the fire loss. One who claims a right of rescission must act with
reasonable promptness, and if after such knowledge, he does any substantial act
which recognizes the contract as in force, such as the acceptance of the more
than half of the premium would be, such an act would usually constitute a waiver
-
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of his right to rescind. In 25 Am. Jur. 653, it is stated: Tt [the defendant
company] cannot treat the policy as void for the purpose of defense to an action
to recover for a loss thereafter occurring, and at the same time treat it as valid
for the purpose of earning and collecting further premiums.'
I d at 758. l
The facts controlling DUC's waiver defense are undisputed and substantially similar
to those in Farrington. Four days after the fire at Kingston's home, Continental's agent
was on the scene and learned the facts Continental relies on to rescind.

[Fact 34]

Continental knew all of those facts before February of 1998, when Continental sent
Kingston a renewal notice, and knew all of those facts when Continental asked for and
accepted Kingston's premium payment and renewed the policy. [Facts 35, 39, 50, 55-57]
Continental's acts in billing Kingston, accepting his premium payments, and renewing
his policy after acquiring knowledge of the facts on which it relies to rescind, acted as
a waiver of any right to rescind the policy as a matter of law. The trial court committed
reversible error in denying DUC and Kingston summary judgment on this issue.

1

Farrington follows black letter common law. If an insurer demands and accepts
premiums after a cause for forfeiture arises, the insurer's act is a waiver its right to a
forfeiture. 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1642. See 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1649 ("An
insurer which, with knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a policy as no longer in force,
receives and accepts a premium on the policy, is estopped to take advantage of the
forfeiture."); 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1637 (If an insurer knowing grounds to rescind
renews a policy, the insurer's act of renewal is a waiver of the right to rescind); 44 Am.
Jur. 2d Insurance §1637 ("The renewal of a policy with knowledge of a ground for
forfeiture waives the forfeiture"); 46 C.J.S. Insurance §830 ("where the company impliedly
recognized the continuing binding effect of a policy by acceptance or enforcement of
payment of a premium, it is precluded from thereafter asserting a breach or a ground for
forfeiture of which, at the time, it has knowledge.").
-
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CONTINENTAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BY IGNORING OR RESOLVING GENUINE
DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT.
A trial court can grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court
must evaluate all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). It only
takes one sworn statement to create an issue of fact. It matters not that the evidence on
one side may appear strong or even compelling; the court may not judge the credibility
of witnesses, or weigh evidence, or deny parties a trial to resolve disputed facts. Spor
v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987); Holbrook Co.
v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). There is evidence from which a jury could
find that any incorrect statements on Kingston's application were either innocent
misstatements or were not material, that Continental did not reasonably rely on
Kingston's application alone, that Continental waived any right to rescind the policy or
is estopped to rescind the policy, and that it was Continental through its agent who
misrepresented the facts to Kingston.

A. Whether Kingston's Statements Were Innocent Is a Jury Question.
A jury could find from the evidence that any incorrect statement on Kingston's
application was an innocent misstatement. From Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co..
181 P. 448 (Utah 1919) to the present, see Fuller v. Director of Finance, State Ins. Fund.
694 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1985), Utah has never allowed an insurer to rescind a policy
-
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based on an insured's innocent misstatement.

In Derbidge v. Mutual Protective

Insur.Co.. 963 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1998) the Court stated:
While Utah's requirements for rescission have evolved somewhat, we note that
[the insurer] has cited no cases - and our own research has unearthed none — where
a Utah court has permitted rescission of an insurance policy based only on an
innocent misstatement by the insured, [at 793]
We agree with the Illinois Court of Appeals, which explained that the words
"misrepresentation or false warranty" denote some deceit," as opposed to innocent
misstatements, which denote good faith. Concluding that an innocent misstatement
constitutes a "misrepresentation" that justifies rescission of an insurance policy
would, we believe contravene our statutory mandate of ensuring that "claimants .
. . are treated fairly and equitably." . . . It would not accord with fairness or the
Insurance Code's purposes to pull the safety net from beneath an insured who makes
an innocent misstatement in an application, [at 796]
An insurer cannot avoid a policy for an innocent misstatement in an insured's
application. kL at 794-96. An insurer cannot avoid a policy without proof the insured
made a material misrepresentation of fact with intent to deceive; false answers not
knowingly made with intent to deceive do not justify rescission. Wootton v. Combined
Ins. Co. of America, 395 P.2d 724 (Utah 1964). As the Derbidge court construes
U.C.A. §31A-21-105(2), a misstatement made in innocence isnota "misrepresentation."
Christensen filled out Kingston's application. [Fact 6] Kingston described the home
as a home built in the 1800's, remodeled around 1990, including updates to the heating,
plumbing, electrical and roofing. [Fact 9] After asking Kingston questions and filling
out the application, Christensen handed it to Kingston to sign. [Facts 16-17] Kingston
saw Christensen had filled in the home's age as having been built in 1990. Kingston
brought to Christensen's attention that the home was built in the 1800's and not 1990 as
Christensen had written. Christensen replied it was appropriate to prepare the form

-
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giving the year of the home's remodel as the home's age.

[Fact 20] Kingston also

understood the home was a single family residence. [Fact 13] Kingston had no way of
knowing what "single family dwelling" meant to Continental, for purposes of the
application process, apart from what Continental's agent told him.
Kingston was justified in relying on Christensen's advice. See Hardy v. Prudential
Ins. Co.. 763 P.2d 761, 768 (Utah 1988): "[A]n insured is usually justified in relying
upon the advice and assistance of a soliciting agent in preparing his application . . .
[A]dvice from an agent . . . is relevant as to whether the insured had an intent to
deceive." Further, "an insurer is generally bound by an incorrect answer entered onto
the application by or at the direction of the agent following disclosure of the true facts by
the applicant." kL at 767-768. The trial court therefore committed reversible error by
refusing to hold Continental was bound by any incorrect answers entered on Kingston's
application by Continental's agent Christensen.
Construing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
Kingston and DUC, a jury could find that Kingston was justified in relying on
Christensen's advice regarding the proper way to prepare the application, and that
Kingston reasonably relied on Christensen to prepare the application.

Kingston

reasonably assumed from Christensen's statements to him that his insurance application
had been prepared properly, paid his premiums, and did not apply for other insurance.
Where a jury could find from the evidence and reasonable inferences that Kingston made
the statements in his application innocently without intent to deceive, it was reversible
error for the trial court to resolve that issue on summary judgment.
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B. Whether Kingston Made Material Misrepresentations is a Jury Question.
The test if a statement on an insurance application is material is objective. The court
in Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1980)
stated the rule: "the materiality of a misstatement on an insurance application is a
question of fact to be determined by the jury on the basis of an industry standard and not
upon the insurer's assertion, made with the advantage of hindsight, that it would not have
issued a policy had it known the truth." The court in Hardy, supra at 768 confirmed an
objective "reasonable insurer" test applies.

A fact is material within the meaning of

Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-105(2)2 "if reasonable insurers would regard the fact as one
which substantially increases the chance that the risk insured against will happen and
therefore would reject the application." Hardy at 769-770.
Utah requires an objective test precisely to keep insurers from doing the very thing
Continental tried here. An insurer who seeks to avoid a policy, rather than offer selfserving after-the fact statements about what it would have done with other information,
must prove what a "reasonable insurer" would have done.
The evidence before the trial court was that under the industry standard in Utah, an
older home is insurable if it has had recent upgrades to the roof, heating, electrical, and
plumbing systems. [Fact 28] If a Utah home built in the 1800's had recent upgrades to
those systems and no obvious structural defects, a reasonable insurer would insure the

U.C.A. §31A-21-105(2) provides, " [N]o misrepresentation ... affects the insurer's
obligations under the policy unless: (a) the insurer relies on it and it is either material or
is made with intent to deceive; or (b) the fact misrepresented or falsely warranted
contributes to the loss."
-
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home. [Fact 30] Thousands of insured homes in Utah were built circa 1900 or earlier.
[Fact 29] Kingston's home was remodeled between approximately 1987 and 1990 with
upgrades to the roof, heating, electrical, and plumbing. [Fact 2] A jury could find a
reasonable insurer would have accepted the risk and issued a home owner's policy. In
light of the above evidence, it was reversible error for the trial court to find Kingston
made a material misrepresentation regarding the home's age.
Continental's own written underwriter policy directed its agents to write policies on
holder homes where the plumbing, heating, wiring and roofing had been upgraded:
While some companies have established underwriting acceptability standards
based upon year of construction (e.g., homes built prior to 1950 are ineligible for
their preferred program), Continental does not subscribe to this philosophy. We
have avoided this type of restrictive approach because an older home can be as
good a risk - and in many cases, an even better risk - than a new home.
Older homes that show evidence of preventive and proper maintenance, including
upgrading of plumbing, heating, wiring, and roofing, can be excellent risks.

[Fact 26] Following this internal policy, the CNA application form contains a line asking
about upgrades on older homes. [Fact 27] Steve Nickel, Continental's own witness and
expert, testified that Continental had issued some 50 policies of which he was personally
aware, insuring homes built in Utah in the 1800's and early 1900?s. [Fact 31] A jury
and could find from the evidence that, even applying a subjective standard, had
Kingston's application stated the house was built in 1890 and had received upgrades to
the heating, electrical, plumbing, and roofing around 1990, Continental would still have
insured the property. Because the question of materiality involves questions of fact, the
trial court erred in granting Continental summary judgment based on the age of the home.

-
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Continental alleged Kingston's application contained a material misstatement about
prior insurance on the home. A jury could find from the evidence that Kingston told
Christensen the home had not been previously insured; that Kingston did not give
Christensen a policy number for prior homeowner insurance; that the space on the
application for prior homeowner's insurance was blank when Kingston signed, and was
filled in by Continental's agents after the last time Kingston saw the application. [Facts
14, 17] Again, it was reversible error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in
light of disputed facts on this issue.
Continental alleged Kingston's application contained a material misstatement that the
home was a single-family residence. At the time Kingston signed the application, only
his immediate family occupied the home, and it was in fact a single family residence.
[Facts 13, 32] Even if Kingston's house was a two family unit residence, Continental's
underwriting guidelines stated, "A Universal Security Policy may be issued to an owneroccupant of a dwelling which is used exclusively for private residential purposes and
contains not more than 2 families with not more than 2 boarders or roomers per family
unit." [Fact 11] Continental has never contended Kingston's home was anything other
than an owner-occupied dwelling, used exclusively for private residential purposes,
containing not more than 2 families [Fact 12], which makes the house insurable as a
single family residence according to Continental's own underwriting guidelines.
Christensen's practice in preparing insurance applications was to ask simply whether one
family lived there. [Fact 10] Since that date, there has never been three families occupy
the residence at the same time, nor has it been used as three separate living quarters.
-
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[Fact 13] Kingston's home was a single family residence. It was therefore reversible
error for the trial court to hold as a matter of law that the application contained a material
misstatement about the home being a single family residence.

C. Whether Continental's Reliance Was Reasonable Is a Jury Question.
A jury could find Continental's did not reasonably rely on the application alone, an
insurer has a common law duty to make an independent investigation of readily available
facts. An insurer cannot rescind a policy for misrepresentation of facts a reasonably
thorough investigation would have disclosed. In State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v.
Wood, 483 P.2d 892 (Utah 1971), State Farm issued Wood an auto insurance policy.
Wood intentionally misrepresented his eligibility for insurance on his application. When
Wood caused an accident, State Farm sought to void the policy. The Court held State
Farm could rescind only if, independent of Wood's application, the insurer had made "a
reasonably thorough and prompt investigation of the insurability of Wood":
[A]t the time the plaintiff issued the policy in question it made no further
investigation of Wood's background or driving record other than that contained
in Wood's application.' There was a public record at the Department of Public
Safety as to a number of traffic violations and also the fact that his driver's
license had been revoked on two occasions by reason of those violations. The
plaintiff owed a duty to the insured as well as to the public to make a reasonable
investigation of the insurability of Wood within a reasonable time after accepting
his application for a liability policy. An insurer cannot neglect its duty to make
a reasonable investigation of insurability or postpone that investigation until after
it learns of a probable claim and still retain its right to rescind. To permit an
insurer to avoid its duty to make a reasonable investigation within a reasonable
time would permit it to retain the premiums and avoid all risk under the policy.
. . . we prefer to base our decision on the proposition of whether or not the
plaintiff lost its right to rescind by reason of its failure to make a reasonable
investigation of insurability.
-
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This matter is remanded to the district court for a further hearing upon the
issue of whether the plaintiff made a reasonably thorough and prompt
investigation of the insurability of Wood after it had issued the policy in
question. The plaintiff has the burden of showing the adequacy of its
investigation.
Id. at 893 [emphasis added].
Under State Farm, Utah law imposes on insurers a legal duty to make a reasonably
thorough independent investigation of an applicant's insurability. State Farm holds that
if an insurer postpones its independent investigation until after its insured makes a claim,
the insurer loses its right to rescind.

There is no evidence Continental made any

investigation whatever, at least until after Kingston called to report a covered loss.
Knowledge of an insurer's agent acquired while acting within the scope of his
authority is imputed to the insurer, even if the agent does not communicate it to the
insurer. Hardy, supra at 767 ("as a general rule, knowledge of an agent of the insurer,
while acting within the scope of his or her authority, is imputed to the insurer, whether
communicated or not."); Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc, 457 F.2d 596,
602-603 (10th Cir. 1972) ("knowledge obtained by an agent of the insurer while acting
within the scope of his authority is imputed to the insurer, whether such is actually
communicated or not.").

A jury could find from the evidence that Kingston told

Christensen the home's true status;

that Christensen's knowledge is imputed to

Continental even if Christensen did not convey that information to Continental; that
Christensen told Kingston Continental would inspect the home, so Kingston reasonably
thought Continental would learn the home's status from its own investigation; that had
Continental inspected the home it would have independently learned the home's status;
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and that Continental failed to investigate and thereby lost any right to rescind. [Facts 4,
6, 9, 13-15, 19, 20, 24] The trial court committed reversible error by resolving these
facts against DUC and Kingston as a matter of law on summary judgment.

D There Are Questions of Fact As To DUC's Defenses.

1. Continental Waived Any Right to Rescind.
Farrington, supra at 758, clearly states, "one who claims a right of rescission must
act with reasonable promptness, and if after such knowledge, he does any substantial act
which recognizes the contract as in force, such as the acceptance of the more than half
of the premium would be, such an act would usually constitute a waiver of his right to
rescind." Continental may try to brush the Farrington opinion aside by arguing it states
the controlling legal principle in dicta. But as the following authorities almost universally
show, Farrington indeed correctly states the law:
•

The authorities cited in Point 1 footnote 1 supra.

•

Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin. 120 U.S. 183, 196 (1887):
[The question was] whether, if insurers accept payment of a premium after they
know that there has been a breach of a condition of the policy, their acceptance
of the premium is a waiver of the right to avoid the policy for that breach. ...
Upon principle and authority, there can be no doubt that it is.

•

Dairvland Ins. Co. v. Kammerer. 327 N.W.2d 618, 620-21 (Neb. 1982):
In 45 C.J.S. Insurance §716 at 696-97 (1946), the author notes: "Insurer is
precluded from asserting a forfeiture where, after acquiring knowledge of the
facts constituting a breach of condition, it has retained the unearned portion of
the premium or has failed to return or tender it back with reasonable promptness,
especially where the nature of the breach or ground for forfeiture is of such
-
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character as to render the policy void from its inception ..." [citations omitted]
Obviously, Auto-Owners had knowledge of the alleged "fraudulent
misrepresentation" at least by the time it filed its answer in this case. And even
though it relied upon rescission in its answer, it nevertheless stood by its earlier
cancellation and kept the portion of the premium earned during the time the
accident occurred. Having waived its right to rescind the policy from its
inception ... Auto-Owners became liable to defend [insureds] ...
•

McCollum v. Continental Cas. Co., 728 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Ariz. App. 1986):
When an insurer has knowledge of facts allegedly justifying a denial of coverage
or the forfeiture of a policy previously issued, an unequivocal act that recognized
the continued existence of the policy or an act wholly inconsistent with a prior
denial of coverage constitutes a waiver thereof. Continental's retention of
Battersby's premiums was such an act.

•

Jackson v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 86 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1939):
"It is a general rule that, where an insurer with knowledge of facts entitling it to
avoid or forfeit a policy, accepts or enforces payment of a premium, or retains
a premium which it has received, it recognizes the continuing existence of the
policy, and is precluded from asserting a forfeiture. This rule applies to the
acceptance or retention of premiums for an unreasonable time." The cases are
unanimous, or at least substantially so, in upholding this rule, and we have no
occasion now or disposition to question it.

•

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Jenkins, 305 S.E.2d 801 (Ga App. 1983):
The demand for payment in full of a future premium subsequently to the breach
of a condition which would have entitled the insurer to insist upon a forfeiture
of the contract will be held to be a waiver of the forfeiture.

•

Neatv. Miller, 17 P.2d 32, 34-35 (Wash. 1932) (citation omitted):
With full knowledge of all the facts the appellant retained the premium for the
period in which the accident happened. Appellant thereby asserted the validity
of the policy for the period covered by the premium and definitely waived every
objection on which the validity of the insurance contract could be denied. ...
"Clearly, the defendant could not assert a right to the premium for valid
insurance, and at the same time insist that the insurance had never been effected.
By claiming and maintaining such a right with full knowledge of all material
circumstances, it unequivocally affirmed the validity of the insurance for the
period covered by the premium, and definitely waived every objection on which
the validity could be denied."
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Assuming for the sake of argument that Continental once had a right to rescind
Kingston's policy, Continental knew of facts giving it a right to rescind no later than July
11, 1997. After knowing of its right to rescind, Continental did not act to rescind with
reasonable promptness, but instead did numerous substantial acts recognizing the policy
as in force. After knowing of its alleged right to rescind:
•

Continental paid Kingston for temporary living expenses. [Facts 37, 46, 54]

•

Continental sent its own employees and agents to inspect the home and determine its
condition and scope of damage. [Facts 35, 37-40, 50]

•

Continental authorized demolition of the home's interior in preparation for the
restoration process, and paid for the demolition work. [Facts 40-45]

•

Continental completed a scope of repairs to restore the home, solicited prices from
two restoration contractors, obtained commitments from the two contractors to do the
restoration work for the price set by its adjuster, and authorized restoration work to
commence on the house at Continental's expense. [Facts 42, 44, 51-53]

•

Continental required Kingston, at considerable expense in time and effort, to prepare
an extensive personal property inventory to establish the dollar amount of personal
property loss, and invoked its contractual rights to require a proof of claim on
personal property losses and to interview Kingston under oath, all of which
Continental had a right to require only if Continental recognized the contract as in
force, and not if it was going to rescind the policy. [Facts 46, 54-55]

•

While undertaking all these acts, Continental took no action to exercise a right to
rescind.

Continental did not inform Kingston the age of the home was even a
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concern. Continental certainly did not inform Kingston it was considering denying
his claim or rescinding the policy based on the home's age.
•

Continental did not tender the return of any premiums as rescission would require it
to do.

Instead, For several years Continental continued to bill Kingston for

premiums, cashed his premium checks, and intentionally continued the policy in full
force and effect. [Fact 56]
Continental did not, by filing this action, reserve a right to rescind. In Dairyland,
supra, an insurer waived any right to rescind by failing to return premiums, after it filed
an Answer raising rescission as a defense. At least one appellate court has already held
that Continental waives any right to rescission when, as in this case, it accepts premium
payments after learning of the facts upon which it relies to rescind:
The trial court properly determined that plaintiff waived its right to seek
rescission of the contract of insurance when it knowingly accepted premium
payments for several months following discovery of the alleged
misrepresentations upon which it claimed to have relied when it issued the
policy. Plaintiffs claimed attempt to both accept premiums and reserve its right
to rescind is unenforceable for lack of mutuality and timeliness. Where an
insurer accepts premiums after learning of an event allowing for cancellation of
the policy, the insurer has waived the right to cancel or rescind.
Continental Ins. Co. v. Helmsley Enterprises, Inc., 622 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1995). This case
is particularly applicable, as it was a decision against Continental, the same Plaintiff as
in this action, on the very point at issue here, entered more than two years before
Continental brought this action against Kingston and DUC. Continental was clearly on
notice that accepting Kingston's premium payment would result it its waiving any right
to rescind, and that its claimed attempt, now as then, to both accept premiums and
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reserve its right to rescind, is unenforceable.

Continental's unequivocal acts of

continuing to treat the policy in full force and effect after knowing facts supporting a
right to rescind is a waiver of the right to rescind as a matter of law.
Continental's acts are sufficient evidence for a jury to find Continental waived any
right to rescind. Continental's acts, treating the policy as in full force and effect, are
either a waiver as a matter of law, or at least raise genuine questions of fact as to
Continental's waiver. Either way, the trial court committed reversible error when, in the
face of undisputed evidence supporting waiver, it rejected the waiver defense by granting
Continental summary judgment.
2. Continental Is Estopped to Rescind.
The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to
act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction
by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Traveler's Ins. Co v. Kearh 896 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah App. 1995). In Traveler's, an
insurer sought a declaratory judgment that an automobile policy did not cover a certain
vehicle. The insurer by course of dealing had allowed the insured to add vehicles to his
policy by calling his agent, automatically insuring a vehicle from the date of the call.
The insured had called his agent to insure the vehicle in question, and the agent did not
disclose that more information was needed to insure that vehicle. This led the insured
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to conclude he had coverage. The appellate court held this was enough for a jury to find
the insurer was estopped to claim the vehicle was not insured from the date of the call.
There are two sequences of events from which a jury could find Continental is
estoppel from denying coverage. First, Christensen acted as Continental's agent in
preparing Kingston's application. Kingston noticed Christensen had written the home
was built in 1990. Kingston told Christensen this was inaccurate, that the home was built
in the 1800's and not 1990. Christensen replied in substance that it was proper to prepare
the application by giving the year of the home's remodel as the home's age. From
Christensen's statement, Kingston reasonably assumed that his insurance application had
been prepared properly, paid his premiums, received his insurance policy, concluded the
home was insured, and did not apply for other insurance. The house and its contents
were then damaged by fire. Kingston would suffer injury if Continental was permitted
to repudiate Christensen's statement to Kingston, deny Kingston's claim, and rescind the
policy. [Facts 3, 9, 20, 24, 33] These facts satisfy all the elements of estoppel.
The second sequence of events stems from the parties' acts following the fire. From
July of 1997 to March of 1998, Continental's every act treated the insurance policy as
valid and Kingston's claims as a covered loss. Kingston reasonably concluded the policy
was valid and his claim covered, and in reliance on his coverage under the policy acted
to his detriment. Kingston hired a demolition contractor and caused the demolition work
to proceed, subjecting himself to personal liability for the cost. Rather than immediately
default on his real estate contract and surrender the home to DUC, for months Kingston
both paid for his "temporary" living quarters and paid DUC its contract payments on the
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damaged house. At Continental's insistence, Kingston put much time and effort into
preparing a proof of loss for his personal property, and consented to an interview under
oath, all of which Continental had no right to insist on, and Kingston had no duty to
perform, if Continental intended to rescind the policy. [Facts 43, 36, 49, 54, 55, 58]
The injury to Kingston if Continental was to repudiate the policy is as previously stated.
Again, the facts satisfy all the elements of estoppel.
Because there are material facts supporting at least two instances where Continental
is estopped to deny Kingston coverage, it was reversible error for the trial court to grant
summary judgment to Continental.

E. There Are Questions Of Fact As To DUC's Counterclaims.
A jury could find Kingston was justified in relying on Christensen's advice. "[A]n
insured is usually justified in relying upon the advice and assistance of a soliciting agent
in preparing his application . . . " Hardy, supra at 768. Also, "an insurer is generally
bound by an incorrect answer entered onto the application by or at the direction of the
agent following disclosure of the true facts by the applicant."

IdL at 767-768.

Knowledge of an insurer's agent, acquired while acting within the scope of his authority,
is imputed to the insurer, even if the agent does not communicate that knowledge to the
insurer. Id. at 767 ("knowledge of an agent of the insurer, while acting within the scope
of his or her authority, is imputed to the insurer, whether communicated or not.").
A jury could find from the evidence: Christensen and his principals Jackson and
Continental had a pecuniary interest in insuring Kingston. Christensen, and therefore
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Continental, owed Kingston a duty of care to use reasonable skill in obtaining the
insurance Kingston wanted. Christensen obtained his knowledge, and did all his acts,
within the scope of his authority as Continental's agent, and his knowledge and acts are
imputed to Continental. Christensen, and therefore Continental, led Kingston to believe
his insurance application as prepared by Christensen would be acceptable to Continental,
and would result in Continental insuring Kingston's home. If Continental's recission
claim is valid, Christensen's and therefore Continental's representation to Kingston was
false. Christensen and therefore Continental either knew his representation was false, or
made it recklessly, knowing he lacked sufficient knowledge to make the representation,
or made it negligently. Christensen and therefore Continental intended that Kingston rely
on the representation. Kingston reasonably relied on Continental's representation, and
acted thereon to his and DUC's injury and damages.
A principal can be liable for the torts of its agent. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 265(1) (a principal is liable for torts which result from reliance upon statements
or conduct within an agent's apparent authority); 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 267 (a principal
is liable for the tortious acts of his agent done within the course and scope of the agent's
employment); Restatement (Second) of Agency §145 (imposing liability on principal for
misrepresentations of agent); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1979)
(principal may be liable for agent's misrepresentations). The Insurance Code, U.C.A.
S31A-23-305, provides, "... every insurer is bound by any act of its agent performed in
this state that is within the scope of the agent's actual (express or implied) or apparent
authority ..." Continental is bound by Christensen's acts with respect to Kingston's
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insurance.

A jury could find from the evidence and reasonable inferences that

Christensen either intentionally, recklessly, or negligently made misrepresentations to
Kingston, and that Kingston relied thereon to his injury and detriment. Therefore, the
trial court committed reversible error in dismissing DUC's counterclaim against
Continental for misrepresentation.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING KATHLEEN WENTZEL'S
AFFIDAVIT AND BRENT CHRISTENSEN'S TESTIMONY.

A. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Kathleen WentzeFs Statement.
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 provides, "A witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter." This requirement is further reflected in Utah R. Civ. Proc
Rule 56(e), which requires that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
In support of summary judgment, Continental relied on an affidavit of Kathleen
Wentzel stating Continental would not have issued Kingston's policy had his application
stated the home's actual age. But Ms. Wentzel testified in her deposition that she did not
process Kingston's application and had not even spoken with the person who did:
Q. Were you working in the underwriting department when this application was
first submitted?

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
it?
A.

Yes.
Do you have any recollection as to whether or not it crossed your desk?
No, it did not.
And I believe you answered that you don't know who might have received
Yes, I do. Kathy O'Rourke reviewed this. [Wentzel depo. p. 49]

Q.
Do you know why it was that you were chosen as the designated
representative and not Kathy O'Rourke?
A. I was the designated representative because when the claim came into CNA
in 1997 I was the underwriter for the state of Utah and I was the underwriter for
Jackson Agency, and Kathy O'Rourke was no longer handling Utah. So I was
the one that reviewed the file, since it was so far back, in 1994. And there was
no issues on the application that we could see that there was any issues to - to
be addressed, so the underwriter that was the designated underwriter for Utah
was very capable of handling it.
Q. Have you spoken with Kathy O'Rourke regarding this matter?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Not at all?
A. No. [Wentzel depo. p. 55]
[R548-549] Wentzel did not process Kingston's application. Continental had her testify
for reasons having nothing to do with the processing of Kingston's application. Wentzel
did not even speak with Kathy O'Rourke, who approved the application. The question
is not what Wentzel might have done, but what O'Rourke would have done. Wentzel's
testimony as to what Continental acting through O'Rourke would have done is not based
on Wentzel's personal knowledge and is inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 602. DUC
timely objected to and moved to strike Wentzel's statements on that basis. The trial court
erred in admitting Wentzel's statements not based on her personal knowledge over
DUC's objection.

The trial court committed reversible error by relying in part on

Wentzel's statements in finding Kingston's application contained material misstatements.
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Brent Christensen's Statements.
Continental also offered deposition testimony of Brent Christensen that Kingston did
not inform him of the home's age. But in his deposition Christensen repeatedly and
unequivocally affirmed he has no personal knowledge of conversations with Kingston:
Q. Now, Mr. Kingston is here at the end of the table. Do you recognize him?
A. I don't.
Q. Do you have any specific recollection as to the events surrounding the filling
out of this application that we are concerned about, Exhibit Number 1?
A. I don't recall any. [Christensen deposition, p. 14 lines 9-15]
Q. Do you remember filling out this application on behalf of Mr. Kingston?
A. Not specifically, no. [Christensen depo. p. 18 lines 12-15]
Q. Now, you don't remember if you sat down personally with Mr. Kingston?
A. I don't. [Christensen depo. p. 44 lines 9-11]
Q. After having gone through this application and having had posed to you the
questions Mr. Trayner has posed to you, does that give you any recollection at
all as to any meetings you have had with Joseph Kingston?
A. No.
Q. You don't recall talking to him on the phone?
A. Well, I would have had to have talked to him on the phone.
Q. Do you have any recollection of having done that?
A. Well, no. I don't recall. I mean sometimes we do 20 of these a day.
Q. You don't recall meeting him personally where your office was?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall any conversations at all that you have had with Joseph
Kingston, either personally or over the telephone?
A. Well, no. [Christensen depo. p. 53 lines 6-24]
[R. 534-538] Any statements by Christensen about conversations with Kingston are by
Christensen's own admission not based on his personal knowledge. DUC timely objected
to and moved to strike those statements as inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 602. The
trial court erred in admitting those statements over DUC's objection. The trial court
relied in part on Christensen's statements in finding Kingston's application contained
material misstatements, making the trial court's decision reversible error.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COSTS.

The standard for awarding deposition costs was stated in Young v. State of Utah,
2000 UT 91 117-8, 16 P.3d 549:
To be taxable as costs, depositions need not be used at trial, provided other
criteria are met. In applying the general rule ... we stated,
This is not to say that the costs of taking a deposition can never be
recovered when the deposition is not used at trial. We have stated that
"we would allow deposition costs as necessary and reasonable where the
development of the case is of such a complex nature that discovery
cannot be accomplished through the less expensive method of
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for the production
of documents."
Thus, deposition costs can be recovered if the trial court determines that the
deposition was essential to the case, either because the deposition was used in
some meaningful way at trial or because the development of the case was of such
a complex nature that the information provided by the deposition could not have
been obtained through less expensive means of discovery. The initial
requirement, that the deposition be taken in good faith, must also be satisfied
before a trial court may award deposition costs.
In this case, the trial court concluded only that the amounts the hospital spent
for depositions and for copies of depositions taken by plaintiff were "reasonable
and necessary," and therefore allowed the hospital to recover these amounts as
costs. A more complete analysis is necessary to determine whether or not these
particular costs are recoverable.
On February 26, 2003, Continental requested an award of costs for the full amount
of deposition and witness fees expended by Continental. On March 3, 2004 Kingston
timely objected to Continental's costs, and served a Motion to Tax Bill of Costs, on the
grounds the depositions were not essential to preparation of the case. On March 18, 3002
Continental served its Memorandum in Opposition to Tax Bill of Costs. Kingston's
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Reply Memorandum was timely served on March 25, 2003. However, on March 21,
2003, before Kingston's motion was submitted for decision, the trial court committed
reversible error by denying Kingston's motion and awarding the full costs requested by
Continental, without making any finding whatever as to whether any of the claimed costs
were "reasonable and necessary" as required by Young.
The trial court improperly awarded Continental costs for the depositions of Brent
Christensen, Paul Capehart, Kathleen Wentzel, and Steve Nickel. These depositions
were noticed and taken by Kingston, accordingly the deposition costs were paid by
Kingston. These persons were all employees or agents of Continental, who could have
obtained any information it wanted from them by means other than depositions. The
Young court held such deposition costs are not recoverable:
The copies the hospital obtained were of the depositions taken of the hospital's
own employees. As the plaintiff points out, there were other methods of
acquiring the information contained in the depositions from the doctors. For
example, the hospital could have interviewed the doctors prior to trial.
Therefore, copies of the doctors' depositions were not essential for the
development and presentation of the hospital's case.
Id at 110.
The trial court improperly awarded Continental costs for a supposed deposition of a
Stacy Kingston. No notice of deposition was ever served for such a person; Kingston and
DUC are not aware any such deposition was ever taken, or even who Stacy Kingston is,
and believe no such deposition was even taken.

Continental claimed this alleged

deposition was necessary to determine who resided at the house at the time of the fire and
for determining the scope of property damage. But there is no evidence that, even if such
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a deposition was taken, any questions were asked as to who resided at the house or the
scope of damage. Continental never relied on such a deposition in any motion.
The trial court improperly awarded Continental costs for the depositions of Elaine
Crossley and Verl Johnson, employees of DUC, and of Rachel Young and Ruth Davis,
employees of Fidelity Funding Company. Continental claims their depositions were
necessary to discover who owned the property. But that question could have been, and
was, answered, by the pleadings of Kingston and DUC, by their answers to Continental's
discovery requests, and by the record title at the Davis County Recorder.

Continental

never used their depositions for any purpose.
The trial court improperly awarded Continental costs for the depositions of Luana
Kingston, Andrea Kingston, Joseph Peter Kingston, Michelle Kingston, Mary Keaton
Brown, and Benny Kingston. Continental claimed these depositions were necessary to
determine who resided at the house at the time of the fire and for determining the scope
of property damage. Continental never used their depositions for any purpose.
Under the Young opinion, the trial court erred in awarding these deposition costs:
... [I]n allowing the hospital to recover these amounts, the trial court failed
to state how the depositions were essential to the hospital's case. The trial court
must find that the depositions were essential because they were used in a
meaningful way at trial, or because the development of the case was of such a
complex nature that the information in the depositions could not be obtained
through less expensive means of discovery, before the hospital can recover these
amounts as costs. The trial court merely concluded that all of the hospital's costs
were "reasonable and necessary" and granted the hospital recovery on that basis.
Id, at 111.
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The trial court improperly awarded Continental costs for the depositions of Tyler
Anderson, Jeffrey Rasmussen, Ken Rasmussen, Johnny Maestas, Don Taylor, and Kimly
Mangum. These persons were all designated as expert witnesses by Kingston and/or
DUC. Their opinions were discoverable by means other than depositions, as by the use
of interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and would have been
produced in any event pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. 26(a)(3). Moreover, this court
"cannot determine whether the trial court exceeded the permitted range of discretion in
awarding costs if the court is not provided with findings on how the deposition was
essential to the prevailing party's case." Young at 1fl3.
Continental's taking of any deposition to determine property damage was not
essential. The fire occurred on July 4, 1997, a Friday; Kingston notified Continental that
same day. By Monday, July 7, 1997, Continental had its own agent on site to inspect and
determine property damage.

Continental's own agents had multiple opportunities,

beginning that day and through the succeeding months, to determine the property damage
first-hand.
For the above reasons, the trial court abused its discretion in its award of costs to
Continental.
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CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT

Based on the above, D. U. Company and Joseph Kingston respectfully ask this Court
to reverse the trial court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of Continental, to
reverse the trial court's order denying summary judgment in favor of DUC and Kingston,
and to remand this action to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment
in favor of DUC and Kingston on the grounds that, based on the undisputed facts,
Continental waived any right to rescind as a matter of law.
Alternatively, DUC and Kingston ask this court to reverse the trial court's orders
granting summary judgment in favor of Continental on the grounds there are genuine
issues of fact relating to DUC's and Kingston's defenses and counterclaims, reverse the
trial court's orders denying DUC's motion to strike the affidavit of Kathleen Wentzel and
portions of the deposition of Brent Christensen, reverse the trial court's order granting
costs to Continental, and remand this action for trial.

DATED June 29, 2004.

<—Atfor

Attorney for Joseph Kingston
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify on June 29, 2004 copies of the above were served by first class mail to
Stephen J Trayner
H Scott Jacobson
STRONG & HANNI
Nine Exchange Place
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys tor Continental Insurance Company
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